PRESERVING MEMORY: NEWARK AND RUTGERS
IN THE 1960’S AND 1970’S

An Interview with

JOHN CULLITY

Conducted by

Gilbert Cohen

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GILBERT COHEN: This is Gil Cohen. This is August 2, 1991. I’m meeting with Professor John Cullity in the Dana Library on the Newark campus. And Dr. Cullity will give us a little background on his academic career. He’s been at Rutgers in Newark since 1963. He is a professor of economics in the Economics Department here on the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in Newark. Professor Cullity.

JOHN CULLITY: Gil, you just asked me to give you a little background, and let me give you a brief resume. I was born November 3, 1928. That’s a very big day in American history. Herbert Hoover defeated Alfred Smith the day I was born. [Laughs] I grew up in Jersey City. And Jersey City is, as you know, only three, four, five miles away from Newark campus. Went to the local schools. Graduated from high school around 1946, right after World War II came to a close. The world I grew up in was a world of depression. There was a depression that lasted from ’29 to ’39. After high school I went to work down in Wall Street. I worked for the New York Stock Exchange and then for a stock brokerage firm for four years. But while I was doing that, I was going to school nights. And by 1950 I’d saved enough money to quit my job and to go to school full time. And I did. And I finished college in 1952, over at St. Peter’s College in Jersey City. Then I went in the Army, and I was in the Army for two years, from ’52 to ’54. And after I came out, I went up to Columbia and did a year or so on a master’s and wanted to go on for a Ph.D. but was broke. The GI Bill didn’t give you much more than ninety or a hundred dollars a month. And that wasn’t enough to keep me alive. In fact, it wasn’t enough to pay the tuition. But I got a job over at St. Peter’s and continued my studies at Columbia and finally finished my Ph.D. around 1963. And that’s the year I came to Rutgers. And I’ve been with Rutgers ever since then.

While I was at Columbia, I had the great advantage of studying with Arthur Burns, who was the premier business cycle expert in the world at that time. Burns had just returned from Washington; he’d been Eisenhower’s chief economic advisor. And I worked with Burns for a couple of years. In fact he was my dissertation sponsor. And probably I stayed in the New York area and came to Rutgers because of my association with Burns. There were many job offers elsewhere in the country. I laugh when I think about some of the offers. There were loads of job offers out at the University of Hawaii when I was [laughs] graduating, and I chose to come to Newark, [laughter] which tells you a little about the way my brain works. But I’ve been Rutgers since then, and it’s been, I think, a very nice relationship. And I’ve been a business-cycle man myself for many years now. And I continue to work very hard at it. And I publish a lot.

COHEN: What led you to the field of economics?

CULLITY: Well, I think I got attracted to it largely because of the environment in which I grew up. And there were a lot of people like me, Depression kids, who looked around, and they saw unemployment all over the lot. It was the number one problem confronting the nation in the
thirties. And I wondered what the heck was responsible for all of that. And I wondered if there wasn’t something that could be done to make the economic system work better. And so when I got to college, I took a course in economics. I must say it wasn’t the best course in the world. The fellow who taught it wasn’t really an economist; he was an historian who’d been mobilized to teach the course. And I just persisted with it. And my experience down in Wall Street certainly added to the attraction of economics. I knew a lot about what was happening in the minute-to-minute trading down on the floor. But I always wondered what the heck was behind it all, what was going on in the economy that was leading to these upticks and downticks. And I always sort of envied those who had an appreciation for the broader picture. I knew a lot about the nitty-gritty of the trading floor. But I didn’t what the heck was going on nationally and internationally. And that was a source of puzzlement for me. And while I was in the Army, I thought of different careers; one of them was law. I thought maybe I’d become a lawyer. But the thought of just spending three years in law school and then another year clerking for someone, and there’s four years, and no income coming in and so forth and so on, I said, well, I’ll just go to Columbia and see if I can learn some economic theory. And I sure enough was introduced to a lot of economic theory that first year up at Columbia. And I decided, well, I like it, and I think I’ll stick with it.

COHEN: In a previous conversation you described to me how you were hired at Rutgers, considering how hiring is done today.

CULLITY: It was a much more informal process than we have now. I decided ’63, and when I arrived…. Well, before I arrived, the hiring process was simple. Helen Cook was the chairman of the department. No, we didn’t have a department. She was—I don’t know. She was the most senior person perhaps in the economics whatever it was called. It was part of a division. And Helen contacted Columbia, and Columbia said, Hey, there’s a job over at Rutgers in Newark. So I called up, and she said, “Well, come on over.” And the office was over on Lombardy Street. I think it’s right where the First Fidelity Bank is right now. And it’s just an old brownstone. And Helen was there. And Morris Beck was there. And there were only three members of the department. Leo Troy was over in England at the time on a Fulbright. And I was interviewed for 15 minutes or so by Helen. I guess she said to me, “Want to step outside for a second or two?” And she and Morris talked for a minute or so. And she said, “Okay. You’ve got the job.” Or something like that. It wasn’t much more formal than that. And sure enough, I did have the job. I didn’t know that they were doing a lot of hiring that year. There were only three members of the department: Helen and Morris and Leo.

And when I arrived in September, I found Stan Kaish, George Constantinopoulos[sp], and my own self. So there was a 100 percent increase in the department in one year. And we were all housed over in James Street. Somehow they’d moved out of Lombardy across the park to Ten James Street. And we had the second floor of a three-story brownstone building. The people on the first floor were the mathematicians, Mathematics Department. And then we had the second floor. And Helen and George Constantinopoulos had desks in one office. And then Leo, Stan, and I were right in another office, three of us in a little room. Morris Beck had this tiny little office. He had an exalted office. He was all by himself up on the third floor. It was like a closet he was in, you know. It wasn’t much more than a closet, but you could put a desk in it. And then up there, I don’t know who the heck was up there. I think maybe some political scientists, maybe Ken Miller and I don’t know. They were either upstairs or in the building right
next to us. There was some sort of a hallway that connected the two buildings. And there was a young guy, a young black fellow, who joined the faculty that year in political science. His name was Chuck Hamilton, and he left after about two years and went to Columbia. I don’t know where he got his Ph.D. He became a distinguished professor at Columbia.

COHEN:  I just want to check the sound here just for a second. [Break in recording] Okay, you were talking about the office facilities on James Street. And I wonder if you could sort of give a broader description of what the campus was like in the old days, in the old Rector Street, James Street, Lombardy Street days before the University Heights campus, if you can. What was it like to teach under those circumstances?

CULLITY:  It wasn’t bad. The facilities were so-so. But that was the case in a lot of institutions. It didn’t surprise me that I had to share an office with two other fellows. I’d been over at Columbia, and some of the distinguished professors I’d studied with had the same kind of thing. They were sharing space. So you didn’t think you had to have your own office. You just said, well, okay. That’s the way the world is. Professors don’t get their own offices or anything like that. And you just go about doing your work. And I thought the students were awfully good. I’d leave Ten James Street, and a lot of my classes that first year or two were in an old bank building I think it was, or an insurance building, right across the park. It was on Washington Place, Washington and Halsey. And it was so—it was a little comical, particularly during the warm weather.

COHEN:  Mm-hmm.

CULLITY:  I had classes on the first floor in that building. And you’d open the windows in order to get a breath of air. And there was a lot of traffic in that neighborhood. [Laughs] And you’d be lecturing to 30 or 35 students, and some of the people in the neighborhood weren’t the icing on the social cake. [laughs]. And they’d be looking in the window and waving at you. [Laughs] So you did get that once in a while. But it wasn’t too bad. And the students were a pretty darned good lot. We got a kick out of it when one of the local characters would look in. It’d just provide a laugh or something like that. But the students were, you know, day-hoppers. They were willing to work. And the faculty was—you know I didn’t know too much about the faculty other than the economics people. But I knew that they were all workers. And I finished up my Ph.D. I’d pretty much written it before the semester started. But I hadn’t defended yet. And it took a couple of months to get the committee together for me to defend. And so I defended the dissertation either that fall or winter.

And I was really very pleasantly surprised by Stan Kaish. Stan arrived—I don’t know whether he’d even started his Ph.D. But he just was a terrific worker. And in the course of three, four, five months he wrote the whole dissertation. And I said, Boy, this guy is a producer. He knows what he’s doing. And I knew that Leo was a producer and Morris also. And Helen was a good leader. And she was a very down-to-earth person. She didn’t try to con you in any way. And she knew what Rutgers was about. And from the very beginning she told all the young people: Look, we’re just assuming you’re good teachers. In this university you’ve got to produce. And that meant research. And don’t ever kid yourself about that business. Don’t think that you’re going to be around here if you’re just a good teacher.
COHEN: And this was at the beginning?

CULLITY: This was from the very—

COHEN: ‘Sixty-three?

CULLITY: From the very beginning Helen made that very clear to all of us, that if you were going to hang around, you had to produce and you had to do research. She did it in a nice pleasant way. There wasn’t anything nasty about it. She was just telling us what the facts were. Now, I think that the standards have gotten higher as the years have gone by. I can remember her admonitions on this point very clearly, that you had to produce. And it was something that really worried me because how am I going to get these articles out? How am I going to get into these refereed journals? If I don’t do it, I’ll be moving on. It was an interesting place to be. The faculty meetings back in those days were over in the Military Park Hotel. And your dean in those days was a guy named Herbert Woodward. And he was a very dapper individual, bowtie, and he knew how to read a meeting. And there were only three or four, five people who ever spoke up, it seems to me. Sidney Greenfield even in those days was speaking up. [Laughter] And there was an old Philosophy by the name of Charlie Biederman. He’d always get up and say his piece. And there were maybe two or three others who would say something. And then that would be that. No one ever got to see Dean Woodward. I don’t think I met him more than once. I think he had a meeting for new members of the faculty the day I arrived, and that was the one and only meeting I ever had with him. And I’m told that no one ever met with Dean Woodward. You didn’t get into his office. And I guess Woodward had a guy who was working as an assistant dean part time. I think his name was Gill. I’m not sure about that. But I think…he taught English.

COHEN: McGill.

CULLITY: McGill. Fred McGill. Fred McGill. Yes. And he’d say a few words at the faculty meeting and that was that. There was never any great amount of controversy at those meetings. But it was interesting. I got a kick out of listening to them.

COHEN: The new campus…. I guess the first classes of the College of Arts and Sciences were in the fall of ’67.

CULLITY: Mm-hmm.

COHEN: How did things change on the campus then? How would you characterize the feeling? Best word.

CULLITY: It made you feel a little better to see these new buildings going up. I guess Conklin Hall was the first, wasn’t it? The first building to go up?

COHEN: I don’t remember the sequence. Conklin and Boyden opened in the fall of ’67. Dana Library.
CULLITY: I'm a little vague on, you know, '65, '66, '67. We got a lot of trouble in Newark then. I don’t know if it was '65, '66.

COHEN: ‘Sixty-seven was the—July of ’67—were the riots.

CULLITY: Yes, then.

COHEN: Do you have any recollections of those events—

CULLITY: Oh, yes! I sure do.

COHEN: —that you recall for the record?

CULLITY: It was in the summer. And I know it was a terrible situation. A lot of people lost their lives in the riots. But it seemed to me that a lot of it happened around one big weekend, either a Thursday? Everything spilled over on a Wednesday or Thursday, and there was a lot of trouble over the weekends. I remember that very well. The National Guard—I guess it was the National Guard—was called in, and there was some shooting all over the place.

COHEN: Were you on campus at the time?

CULLITY: Oh, yes.

COHEN: During the actual outbreaks?

CULLITY: I came down. I was teaching summer school on a Monday morning. And the TV screen had been loaded with pictures of National Guardsmen that weekend. And people shooting rifles and this, that, and the other thing. And I had a class on Monday morning.

COHEN: Where? Where was the class?

CULLITY: Over on Washington Street.

COHEN: On Washington Street or Washington Place?

CULLITY: No, no, it was Washington Street, 101 Washington Street, I think.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: And I was teaching a course in business cycles and had ten students in this class. And I thought, I have to be crazy. I drove into Newark, parked my car over in back of the house over on James Street. There was no one around there. And then I proceeded—it was about eight-thirty in the morning—I proceeded along Washington Street to go down to 101 Washington Street. And there wasn’t anyone in the streets. And I kept on looking up at the tops of the buildings. There’d been all this talk about snipers and so forth and so on. And I thought, oh, my God! Am I crazy coming down here? And I got to class, and I think there were six or seven out
of the ten kids who showed up for class that morning. And that surprised me. I thought—I thought I was a little nuts to come down. But the fact that six or seven showed up persuaded me that maybe it was contagious; we’re all crazy. [Laughter] Am I supposed to talk about Joseph Schumpeter [laughter] when they’re shooting each other about three blocks away?

COHEN: That’s really pretty good.

CULLITY: I began…and Schumpeter had his heroes, cut I didn’t feel particularly heroic. But I do remember that situation during the riots. I remember it very well because I was scared stiff. But I do remember…I can’t remember the details, but I do remember that there was a takeover of Conklin Hall.

COHEN: That was in February ’69.

CULLITY: Yes, that was much later.

COHEN: Yes. I just want to ask, during the riots, at that time, did you have any perspective on the reasons for or—

CULLITY: No.

COHEN: Or had you what was your sort of—the whys of the thing.

CULLITY: No, I really didn’t. I was into my own work. I was going to class. I was trying to get stuff published. I was trying to think of journal articles that would make it into the journals. And I was very much into myself. I guess I’d gone through maybe the first three years—I guess I had a three-year contract, and I knew I had to have a bunch of articles out within the next year or two. And I really wasn’t thinking about that sort of thing. And it seemed to me…it’s a long time ago, and there was a flare-up of some sort. The proximate cause of it had something to do with an automobile accident. One thing led to another. And there was trouble at a police station in Newark. But I can’t remember the details of that, nor did I give much thought at the time or beforehand to the ultimate reasons.

COHEN: In retrospect, what do you think about its impact on the—well, the campus, the city? I guess specifically the campus.

CULLITY: I think it has hurt us over the years. Here we are in 1991. Our enrollments probably aren’t a heck of a lot higher in 1991 than they were in 1965, 1966. Maybe they’re higher, a little higher. I don’t know. But I think that before those things occurred, we used to get a lot of students from the suburbs. We still do. But I think that many people who were out in the suburbs got the impression that Newark was unsafe, and they wouldn’t send their sons and daughters into it, to the school here. And we’ve always had trouble recruiting students. So I think it hurt our development.

COHEN: Recruiting students. How about the recruitment of faculty? Did that suffer with one thing and another?
CULLITY: I don’t think so. I don’t think so. Newark has a good side, too. And for an economics faculty, the good side is that, one, Newark is a financial center. But two, it’s right next to New York City. And we’ve always been able to tell people, hey, you’ve got great libraries around here. You’ve got Wall Street right next door. There are possible opportunities for you in the area of consulting, this, that, and the other thing. So I don’t think we’ve been hurt that much. Perhaps some. But it’s funny with the faculty. Very few faculty members that I know of live in Newark. And it’s always been that way. They’ve always lived out in the suburbs. And it’s just like the people who are working for Prudential, the executives and others; they come in and out. Boom, boom, boom. It might have injured us, but I don’t think it has to any great degree with faculty. Because I think Rutgers has had an attractive salary schedule. I think that the Rutgers salaries have been very competitive. In fact the AUUP lists Rutgers pretty high in terms of compensation of faculty. I guess it has top rating.

COHEN: Yea I believe so, for years, or pretty close to them.

CULLITY: Sure.

COHEN: In February of ’69 the takeover of Conklin Hall occurred.

CULLITY: Mm-hmm.

COHEN: That was the Black Organization of Students.

CULLITY: Yes, yes.

COHEN: And my question is, did you have any sense at the time of what the grievance was which led to such an event?

CULLITY: At the time I’m sure I did have, a pretty good idea of what the heck the grievances were. But that’s 22 years ago, I think, if my arithmetic is right. ‘Sixty-nine and ’91. Is that 22 years ago? Yes, it’s 22. One of the things that was bothering the students—and it wasn’t the only thing—was admissions. And I wish I could remember all the details of the faculty meetings that occurred in the middle sixties, even before 1969. It really would be worthwhile going back to the minutes of the big faculty meetings in that era. And I’ll tell you why.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: It seems to me that the faculty was trying to address in the mid-sixties the problem of special admissions.

COHEN: This is now the old campus here.

CULLITY: Yes. Well….

COHEN: In the mid-sixties. Okay.
CULLITY: I’d say ’66, ’67, somewhere in there. I think one of the fellows who would know a lot about that was Warren Manspeizer. I just have a hunch that he was involved in that. And I remember vaguely faculty debates at the time, involving this special admissions. And maybe Manspeizer, maybe Charlie Pine, people like that, were involved. Those are the pictures that come into my head when I think about it. And they were onto something. And what they wanted to do was to set aside—I don’t know what the number was—60, 70, 80 places in the freshman class for those who were disadvantaged. Now I don’t know whether the question of race entered into that matter. I think that they had in mind taking kids who were disadvantaged of all races. And setting up a special program that would provide remedial training. And I think something like that was passed by the faculty. My recollection is that we were doing something before the riots. And maybe a year, two years, I don’t know. Maybe I’m wrong on that. But I think I’m right. And then that sort of thing was pooh-poohed when the riots came along.

COHEN: Pooh-poohed?

CULLITY: Pooh-poohed. Those who taken—not the riots, pardon me. When the student takeover.

COHEN: Takeover of Conklin Hall.

CULLITY: When the takeover occurred, that was deemed to be a totally inadequate response to the needs of the community.

COHEN: When you say that, you mean the…. [Break in recording] We were talking about attempts at a remedial program for disadvantaged students back in the middle, late sixties, before—three years before the takeover of Conklin Hall.

CULLITY: Could have been

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: Could have been. And I think that Warren might be the guy to check on that. Maybe I’m wrong. Pine might know something about it. But at any rate, a takeover did occur. Now, I think…you correct me if I’m wrong, Gil. When the takeover occurred, perhaps Gilliland, Bill Gilliland, was still the dean or maybe he was not.

COHEN: I think that Malcolm Talbott then was acting dean of the college. He was first vice president of the Campus.

CULLITY: Right. Woodward had been replaced by Bill Gilliland.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: And I don’t know how long Bill Gilliland lasted. Maybe a year, two years.
COHEN: Yes, yes.

CULLITY: And then I do know that in the midst of the takeover, I surely can remember that Malcolm Talbott, who was a professor of law, came in, and he was made acting dean.

COHEN: Yes. That’s true.

CULLITY: And I know Manspeizer and I can’t recall the others were involved in the immediate negotiations with the students, the BOS students. Subsequently—and I had no role to play in that—subsequently Henry Blumenthal became dean.

COHEN: Yes, after Talbott left as acting dean.

CULLITY: After Talbott. And the BOS students continued to make demands on Henry Blumenthal. And they may indeed also have had some faculty, black faculty, who were supporting them at the time. I can’t give you the names. Perhaps Jim Ramsey was part of the group; I don’t know. But I do remember that Henry Blumenthal appointed me to a group that met one summer with students and black faculty members. I think Gil Panson was involved; he may even have chaired that group, I’m not sure. Or maybe Henry chaired it himself. But we received a lot of paper from BOS, and they had documents in which they indicated what they wanted. And they wanted not only additional students to be admitted, but they wanted a special admissions office for black students, a number of special programs. There was one document that sort of suggested there would be almost a separate black college inside the College of Arts and Sciences. It was a—I don’t know whether it was just a bargaining ploy on their part or not. But we met. We must have met every week for an entire summer. At least once a week.

COHEN: This was after the takeover.

CULLITY: Oh, yes. Yes, yes.

COHEN: It was all over. ’69 was the takeover, so…

CULLITY: Yes, yes, yes. Oh, yes. Yes.

COHEN: So it must have been the—it was probably the summer of ’69 perhaps.

CULLITY: Perhaps. Yes. I can’t recall. But what came of that effort, I don’t know. Eventually I guess we all got tired of meeting. And it stopped. I don’t know whatever happened. But that did take up a lot of my time at the time.

COHEN: In retrospect, how do you perceive the effect, the historical significance of the takeover of Conklin Hall? Big sort of question.

CULLITY: Oh, yes, it is a big question. But, you know, Rutgers is like every other bureaucracy. I hate to say that. I’d like to think we’re special. But many years ago I heard a lecture by Milton Friedman who’s Nobel Laureate out at Chicago. And Friedman made a very interesting point. He
said, “People who are pushing their own interests politically will push and push and push to get something done. And then they get what they want. And then they walk away. And they turn their interest to other areas. But they don’t get what they thought they were going to get because those who are left behind stay there, and they have their own interests.” The bureaucracy, the professorate has its own interest. The political activists move on. They graduate. They go to this place, that place, and this place. But the professors are still around, the deans are still around, the librarians are still around. We’re all still here. And we have our own perception of how we think the place should operate. And eventually those interests make their way back in, and little changes occur here and there, here and there. And the revolution has occurred, but all the revolutionaries have left. And the bureaucrats, the professors and so forth, are still around, and they work it back to where they would like it to be—as best they can. So that’s the framework that I had in mind in responding to your question. The youngsters who were involved in the takeover back in 1969, they had good intentions. Most of them had very good intentions. Maybe all of them had good intentions. But they left. And they can’t control what professors do—or what deans do or what presidents of universities do. And maybe that sounds cynical, but I think that’s realistic.

COHEN: But what impact did the takeover have, let’s say, on the composition of the student body?

CULLITY: I don’t know. I don’t know the numbers. I don’t know the statistics today. As I look around…. Just last week, I was reading a book review in the New Leader by an historian down at Rutgers in New Brunswick. I think he’s named McNeil or something like that. And he had just reviewed this book on a liberal education.

COHEN: Oh, yes.

CULLITY: And in the book review he said that 38 percent of the incoming students at Rutgers, in the freshman year, were black and Hispanic. Now I don’t believe that. I don’t think…. I thought it was a pretty good review. But I just don’t…. I think that number was wrong. My perception is that with black youngsters I guess we have maybe, I don’t know, 13, 14, 15 percent of them around here?

COHEN: Probably somewhere around there.

CULLITY: Somewhere in that ballpark. Now, that’s somewhat higher, I think, than it was in 1965, ’66. Sure it is. I don’t know. Probably in 1963, when I got here, there weren’t many black kids at all. But whether that is…. See, it’s hard to get at causes. If you ask the question, is the increase due to the takeover of the building, I really believe that that’s probably a small part of the story. It’s a bigger picture that is responsible for the increase in the relative number of people, black people, youngsters, in our classes. You’d see that in lots and lots of communities where there were no takeovers.

COHEN: Yes. Sure. What was your perception of the level of preparation of the students that you have taught in the period—well, your career? I think your sort of sense a development, the changes if any.
CULLITY: We talk a lot about that. There are fellows up in my department on the eighth floor in Hill Hall who are of the decided opinion that the student body is getting weaker. I’ve just been around too long. I happen to think that one of my strengths is memory. And I started teaching back in 1955-56. I think there are a lot of people who have this dream that back then everyone was a hardworking student. They were all really nose-to-the-grindstone types. And there were a lot of students I encountered back then who weren’t hard workers. There are a lot around now who aren’t hard workers. There are plenty who are, too. My opinion is that there isn’t much difference.

COHEN: There have been remarks made about grade inflation during the seventies and in the eighties. What’s your perception of that?

CULLITY: I can only speak for myself.

COHEN: Sure.

CULLITY: I think there’s a tendency for older professors to be easier graders.

COHEN: Older professors!

CULLITY: Older professors, guys like me. [Laughs] To soften up over the years. When you come right out of graduate school and you spent ten hours, 11 hours a day in the library, you’re going to be awfully tough on the student. If he’s going to get an A or she’s going to get an A, they are going to work just as hard as you did. When you get to be 55 or 60 or 62, whatever, you mellow. Vinegar Joe Stilwell had a motto: [in Latin]. Don’t let the bastards grind you down. [Laughs] Well, they do grind you down. And I think you tend to get a little softer. Now this past semester I think that I grade inflated my own self. And I really am very unhappy with my own performance. I just let them get away with a little too much. I’m not talking about the students in my introductory course. But I’m talking about the business-cycle students that I had. And there were a lot of very high grades in that class. And I don’t think that they all deserved it. And I’ve been waiting to get back in the classroom this September to make up for that. I’ve already got 25 books on the reading list here in the library, and I’m ready to see if I can do a better job this semester.

COHEN: What a good job that is. I’ve heard of that, but my Latin being nonexistent, I appreciate that.

CULLITY: About people grinding you down, too. We had a conversation the other day over the phone. I told you at that time that you’d better watch out for any bias in my comments because I was suffering from Irish Alzheimer’s. [Laughter]

COHEN: Which is?

CULLITY: I forgot everything except my grudges. [Laughter]
COHEN: Shall we get into grudges? [Laughter]

CULLITY: Well, I hope they’re not grudges anymore. I’m trying to be a nicer, gentler and a kinder person.

COHEN: Well, maybe we can deal with grudges as a general topic.


COHEN: Yes. I mean you say… I mean to the extent that you’ve been…I’m assuming you have certain criticisms of how things have functioned in Newark and so on.

CULLITY: It hasn’t worked out…you know exactly…

COHEN: What are some of the key grudges that you could address?

CULLITY: Well, let me stick to my knitting, economics.

COHEN: Sure.

CULLITY: And business. For many years in the early seventies Leo Troy and I pretty much ran the Economics Department. Leo was chairman. But when he went on leave, I would take over. And we talked a lot. And I would write a lot of letters and reports and so forth that came out of the department. And it was a fairly good-sized department. And when Leo went on leave around 1970 or so, I had delegations of students coming in to see me. And what they wanted was a business major. And they wanted it to be more specific. Many of them wanted an accounting major. They wanted to be able to sit for the CPA. And I told them I would see what I could do for them. Now, the Graduate School of Business was…. Let me go back. It was the School of Business that became the Graduate School of Business in the 1960’s. There was a report that was financed by the Carnegie Foundation. And it was authored by Aaron Gordon who taught at—he was a business-cycle man—and he taught at the University of California. Aaron Gordon and another guy wrote this big report, and they said there shouldn’t be any such thing as undergraduate business education.

That report came out around 1960. Our School of Business used that report as a springboard to get out of undergraduate business education. And Horace dePodwin, who was the dean at the time, wanted strictly graduate education. I knew the arguments that were in the Gordon Report. But at any rate, Horace got rid of some faculty members who didn’t fit into his plan. He sent us over three fellows whom he thought would be better off teaching some undergraduate business courses. And Leo was the chairman of our department at the time, and he took them in. And then I got involved when he went on leave. And by the time Leo came back, I said, “The students are all over the place. They want a business program, and they want an accounting program and so forth. There’s a big demand for this.” And so we went ahead and tried to get the approval of people to set up an accounting major and a business major. And we did. We got such approval. Okay. We had loads of students, hundreds and hundreds of students.
COHEN: In the early seventies.

CULLITY: Hundreds of students. I don’t know if I have—I had a document here.

COHEN: What was the title of that document?

CULLITY: The document—I’ll give you this. I brought it for you specifically.

COHEN: A position paper, yes.

CULLITY: A position paper on the accounting, business, and economics programs. And a proposal to establish a Division of Economics and Management. This came—

COHEN: This was written in the late—

CULLITY: Nineteen seventy-nine. But it has data on the number of students we had in the department. We had hundreds of students. We had in 1974-75, we had over 400 students in economics and business at that time. By ’76 we had 550 full-time equivalent students. So we had loads and loads of people. We wanted to give them a quality education. Enrollments in the college were going down and down and down outside economics and business. The number of lines were going down, down, and down. Our enrollments were skyrocketing. And the numbers are in this position paper. At the same time, our staff was not only not increasing, it was falling. We weren’t getting additional lines. We lost a line or two while enrollments were up 100, 200 percent. In economics in the mid-seventies, the average class size in economics was something like 55 students to a teacher. Across the college it was something like 14, 15 students. So we were concerned about this. We didn’t have the resources to do the job. And we let the administration know about this over and over and over again. We went in to see Richard Robey, who had replaced Blumenthal, was dean. We went in to see Norman Samuels. We complained about things. They would smile. And on the way out they’d pat us on the back and say, “You guys are doing a terrific job with the limited resources you’ve got. Congratulations!” That sort of thing. But that wasn’t doing us any—that pat on the back wasn’t doing us any good.

We knew that we had to have more resources in order to do the job. If we wanted to hire an accountant, we knew what the standards were for the AACSB degree. We knew that they insisted that you had to have a certain number of Ph.D.’s. We’ve always been dubious about that particular requirement for accountants. A lot of very, very good accountants, most of the best accountants, probably don’t have Ph.D.’s in accounting. They’re CPA’s. But, okay, we knew that that was a requirement. We went into the marketplace. It cost 35, 40 thousand dollars for a Ph.D. in accounting. And they’d tell us to go out and hire someone at 15,000, 16,000. And this individual was supposed to have a Ph.D. And there was no such—we couldn’t hire people for that. So it was a very frustrating experience. We ran a department with one secretary, sometimes one and a half. And we had 500, 600 students, 20-some faculty members. So that was a source for considerable annoyance on our part all along. And eventually—And we knew that there were inadequacies with the program. Had to be. Eventually someone must have complained—as they had every right to—to someone on the board of governors or somewhere up in the university. Somewhere way up in the university someone started saying what the hell’s going on over there?
And I think the word was spread that we were misallocating resources. We had all the resources that we needed, but we weren’t using them efficiently.

COHEN: The department?

CULLITY: Yes, yes, yes.

COHEN: You were dealing then with your dean, with Robey?

CULLITY: Richard Robey and then Norman.

COHEN: Norman followed Robey.

CULLITY: That’s right.

COHEN: So even though you were dealing with Robey; and then after he left, you were then dealing with Samuels.

CULLITY: Yes. Sure.

COHEN: Did you—are you dealing at all with the provost then, James Young?

CULLITY: I don’t— No, we were dealing strictly with the dean. I don’t know when Jim Young came in. I don’t know what….

COHEN: 1972—?

CULLITY: Really. Really. No, no. We didn’t have any dealing with Jim Young. The only one I can ever remember in administration that we ever saw was a guy by the name of Pierson [sp].

COHEN: Pierson [sp]?

CULLITY: Pierson [sp]. Who later became…. He was Ed Bloustein’s number two man. And Leo and I went down one day to New Brunswick. And we talked with Pierson [sp] about this, our problems. But Pierson had already made up his mind what the story was. So we got no support from him. We got no support from Horace dePodwin in our efforts to get additional resources. And that was that. So someone I think somewhere in the administration, I don’t know where the idea was hatched, said that has to be restructured. And we agreed that there had to be a restructuring. But how it was to be done was the question. And we got into a big fight with Norman on the floor of the faculty in June of 1979.

COHEN: How do you explain the resistance to the allocation, the request for the allocation, of additional resources, considering the tremendous enrollments?

CULLITY: I think it’s a question of keeping peace inside the academic family here in Newark. Enrollments were going down. The number of faculty lines were going down. The deans did not
want to take lines away from the other disciplines. That’s the only place the lines could have come from. And so it was this political juggling game that was going on. It was us against them. Those bad guys over in economics and business who are trying to grab your jobs. And that was the line that was pushed. And that’s the line that prevailed. And it prevailed until 1979 or so, 1980. And that was that. We had quite a fight on the faculty floor about that whole business.

COHEN: Do you remember that?

CULLITY: Oh, yes.

COHEN: That particular—do you remember some details of that floor fight?

CULLITY: Oh, yes. Sure. Sure. One, we didn’t even know at the start…neither Leo nor I knew at the start that there was a committee that was studying the restructuring of business education. It was in our department.

COHEN: Hmm. And that was—

CULLITY: That was taking place in committee. And then somehow someone told me that that was going on. Well, as soon as we learned that, we went to the committee and said our piece. But the committee had already pretty much made up its mind what it was going to do. And we were unsuccessful in pushing our own view. But at any rate, we knew we had a faculty that was going to vote against us when we got to the floor of the faculty. We were absolutely clear that we had no chance of prevailing in the argument that we were having with the dean. You were not going to get a faculty opposing the dean when he had control over lines all over the place. And he considered this a key fight for him to win. And for whatever reason, we were unpopular. One of the interesting things about the debate was that we knew we couldn’t win the votes. We knew that the department was going to be split off; there’d be a separate business/accounting. We knew that was going to happen. Well, we knew that the vote would be for that on the faculty floor. But we’d done some homework. We’d done a lot of homework. We wrote up this 60-, 70-page paper, and we distributed it to everyone. No one ever read it, as a matter of fact. [Laughs] I thought it would be a waste of a week’s work, and it sure as heck was. No one ever read this document. But we’d also read the faculty bylaws before we went into the fight. And we were pretty sure that we would be able to foil the effort to restructure the way the dean wanted to restructure on the basis of the bylaws.

COHEN: Restructuring so there’d be a new department?

CULLITY: Yes. Totally new.

COHEN: Separate department.

CULLITY: Right. We thought we were—we were pretty convinced we could win that one. And what it came down to was this: The university bylaws—Pardon, the college bylaws had a provision that was designed to protect departments from restructuring. And the bylaws—and I haven’t read it in 12 years; I don’t want to read it. [Laughter] I’ll never read it again. And it’s
been changed anyway. But it said something like this: That if you’re going to restructure a department or eliminate a department or create a new department, you have to have two thirds of the votes of the total faculty.

COHEN: Total faculty.

CULLITY: The total faculty.

COHEN: Not just the attending.

CULLITY: Not just the attending. We knew that probably there were let’s say 120, 140 people at the meeting. There were 120 that hadn’t shown up for the meeting. So even though we were going to lose the vote—and we would even lose by two thirds—that they couldn’t do this because they didn’t have two thirds of the total faculty. So after the vote was taken, we raised the motion: This is an illegal action. You can’t do this. It is in violation of the bylaws. The dean then said, “My interpretation of the bylaws is that it’s two thirds of those who are at the meeting.”

COHEN: This was Samuels?

CULLITY: Yes. Mm-hmm. We challenged that decision, and it was put to the faculty at the meeting. [Laughs] And they agreed with the dean’s interpretation. [End of Tape #1]

COHEN: We’re back with Dr. Cullity. And we were talking about the meeting, the faculty meeting.

CULLITY: Okay.

COHEN: The setting up of the new department.

CULLITY: So that was that. They set up a committee headed up by Norman—Norman appointed a committee headed up by Drexel Gottfried. And I don’t know who the heck else was on that committee. But they affirmed that the decision that had been made by the chair was the correct decision.

COHEN: Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: Well, steam was coming out of our ears at the time. Then we were thinking about what to do. I was friendly with Willard Heckel, who was the dean of the law school—or had been dean at the time. He was a professor of law. I’d brought over the bylaws to Will, and I said, “What is this? What are these bylaws saying? Can you interpret them? Am I right on this, or am I wrong?” And he said, “No, it says two thirds of the total faculty, not two thirds of those who are at the meeting.” That was that. I said, “Thank you very much. I just wanted the reassurance that I was fine, wasn’t going whacky.” Leo was very, very angry. And he was at that time suggesting he was going to go to a lawyer and bring a lawyer into it. And my attitude was, ah, I don’t care anymore. And Leo’s family, wife and kids, said, “Relax. Forget it.”
COHEN: Was Leo chairing then?

CULLITY: No. But he thought he had a very, very big interest this whole thing. And finally the kids and Sandy convinced him that he shouldn’t do that. And we all walked away from the situation. I was chair of the department.

COHEN: You were chair.

CULLITY: Yes. And shortly thereafter, about a month, two months, that was over. I went down to see Norman. I said, “Look, there’s no sense in me staying on as chair. We’re not getting along. And we won’t get along. And it won’t do the department any good. And I have other things I want to do. Stan Kaish is a good guy. Let him be chair of the department. And I’m sure the departments will both work.” And that’s what happened.

COHEN: Why did Samuels and the administration insist upon the separate department?

CULLITY: I think what they wanted was a scapegoat. Somehow or other they wanted to show that something was being done. We had been used in this whole game, and the story had been concocted that we were misallocating resources. We were inefficiently using resources. So they needed to restructure. They had to get business and accounting out from under these bad guys who weren’t using resources efficiently. And so something had to be done. And we just happened to be in the way.

COHEN: Did any of the requirements of the AACSB have anything to do with the demand on the part of the administration to have a separate business department? Was there any requirement there?

CULLITY: Stan could—I know you’ve talked with Stan Kaish on this. And Stan knew more about the requirements of the AACSB than anyone else. When business and accounting were in the Economics Department, Stan played a very heavy role in the area of business and accounting. And in fact we sent Stan out to St. Louis, I think, which is where the headquarters of the AACSB is. And we said: Find out what you can about the requirements. Find out whether or not the structure that we have is okay. And Stan knows what the story—There are any number of possible structures that were reasonable structures. As I recall, Stan said the structure we’ve got now is okay. But we weren’t even interested in having—we weren’t interested in the status quo. We were interested in setting up a division, some sort of a division, of economics, business, accounting, which we thought would work within the AACSB criteria. So we were not in favor—Economics was not in favor at all of the status quo. We wanted more resources, a different structure and so forth. And I think what they finally came down with, what they have now, is save the Economics Department, what we were suggesting in 1979. And in fact when Stan left the Economics Department to go over to Business, I remember that he and I had a meeting with Norm Samuels and Dave Haspin [sp] over at one of these businessmen’s clubs. And they told us about their ideas for the establishment of some sort of a department, a department over in Bradley Hall. And I know that Stan went over. I didn’t know whether, when the meeting—in the middle of the meeting I had a sense that maybe they were asking if I wanted to go over also. And as soon as I got that sense, I said, “By the way, I’m not interested in going..."
anywhere. I’m into economics, and I’m having fun right now.” But I remember in the middle of the meeting saying to the group, “But it seems to me what you’re proposing is what we proposed in 1979. You’re moving to exactly the kind of thing that we wanted to do.” And Norman said, “I knew you couldn’t resist saying that.” But they had tried to move not exactly toward what we wanted, what we had in mind but something similar to that. I don’t know how successful it’s been.

COHEN: When you say something similar, the administration, Samuels, was interested in a separate department.

CULLITY: Yes, yes.

COHEN: And their proposal was to include the business program within the Economics Department.

CULLITY: Well, we had a proposal that would set up a division. And under that division, under the director of that division, someone playing a role similar to the role that Stan plays, associate dean.

COHEN: That was your proposal?

CULLITY: Yes. We had something very similar to that. The only difference is that it let Economics…. In that proposal Economics would have been inside. The way it has worked out, it’s outside; it’s not part of it.

COHEN: Oh, Economics would have been inside that division.

CULLITY: Yes, yes. As a separate unit inside the division.

COHEN: I see. Was this proposal written as a document?

CULLITY: Oh, yes. This is it.

COHEN: Before you were talking about it was included in the document.

CULLITY: That’s right.

COHEN: So the division that was set up with Stan as the head basically included business and accounting, but it excluded economics.

CULLITY: That’s right. That’s right.

COHEN: Jumping ahead now, but considering what’s happened recently with the recent faculty—I didn’t attend the meeting—the proposal to…. Isn’t there a proposal to place the business and accounting under the aegis of the Graduate School of Management?
CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: Could you?

CULLITY: No, I can’t speak to that because I’m not involved in that. Stan has been involved, and he’s been meeting all summer. There’s a committee that has come up with a report, which I think is on the president’s desk or pretty close to the president’s desk, and I think they’re going to do something about restructuring in the fall. But if I could go back a little bit, after I left the chairmanship of the Economics Department, I had other things to do around here. And one of the things that I was very much interested in doing—and I continue to do it—is to associate myself with the Center for International Business Cycle Research. Now, in 1968—pardon me, 1978—Horace dePodwin and I were able to bring a Center for Business Cycle Research to the Newark campus. It was a fellow by the name of Jeff Moore, who had been vice president for research at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Then subsequently became commissioner of labor statistics for the Department of Labor. Jeff came out and gave a lecture.

And the day he gave the lecture, I met him at the station, Penn Station, drove him to campus. And then I drove him back after the meeting was over. We had a conversation. And he told me he wasn’t happy at the National Bureau and he’d like to set up an independent center. I said, “Why not on our campus?” And I got a hold of ours. And Jeff said he wanted to be associated with a graduate school of business. So Horace was the dean of the Graduate School of Business, and I said Jeff wants a center. And we logged six or seven months of work. We put in a lot of work, and we finally got—the university approved—the center. So in 1979, after all of my troubles with the economics stuff was out of the way, I just said, hey, I’m going to do something constructive. And so I went over and worked with Jeff. And we worked together for about four years. And then Jeff took his shop and went over to Columbia where he continues to operate.

COHEN: Why did Jeff Moore want to leave Rutgers?

CULLITY: Had something to do with money. These centers have to be self-supporting.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Oh?

CULLITY: Never any question about that. We had a problem with the center right from the very beginning with raising a lot of money. We were spending money. And one of our problems was that the computer people at Rutgers couldn’t fulfill promises that they made to us. The kind of research that we do here requires an enormous use of the computer. And all of Jeff’s programs were in a certain computer language. That language had to be translated into language that the Rutgers computers could use—could understand.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: Could understand.

COHEN: Yes.
CULLITY: We’d received promises from the computer people that the translations would be made.

COHEN: Computer people in New Brunswick?

CULLITY: In New Brunswick. Jim Young was the provost at the time. It was absolutely clear that the computer people would make those translations. Four years later they still had not made the translations. It was a task that shouldn’t have taken more than a few months. In fact when Jeff got over to Columbia, the task was accomplished within a couple of months. The fact that it was not, that task was not accomplished, meant that enormous bills were being run up at MIT. And we were running it like a—the MIT bill cost us about $100,000.

COHEN: This was all online through MIT?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: Over telephone lines?

CULLITY: Yes, yes.

COHEN: Over telephone lines.

CULLITY: Yes, yes.

COHEN: Over telephone lines. You’re not talking about shipping tapes down.

CULLITY: No, no, no. Now Jim Young understood the situation, but then Jim was replaced by Norman. And Horace was also replaced by Blake. Horace had been a big supporter of the center. Now you had a new man, Blake. Jim Young had an interest in the center. He’d been replaced by Norman. And that was that. They looked at the $100,000 bill from MIT, and they stopped complaining. And then Moore attempted to get to see the administration. He wrote to Norman a number of letters, asking if we could sit down and chat and talk about this thing. And he received no responses. And when you don’t receive responses, then you know the guy you’re writing to doesn’t want to hear from you. And Columbia had contacted Moore. And they said, Hey, if you ever want to move the center over, we’d like to have you. So Moore said, “What, am I crazy?” He lives up in New Canaan, Connecticut, and he’s taking a train from New Canaan all the way into Newark, and he can’t even get a response to a letter? So he just simply said, “So long.” And packed up his file cabinets and off he went. Yes, yes, yes.

COHEN: In retrospect, were there any regrets on the part of administration within Rutgers about the departure of the center?

CULLITY: No. I’ve never heard them say a word.

COHEN: Hmm.
CULLITY: No, no. I’ve heard faculty members say it was a shame. But I’ve never heard the administration say a word. [Laughs] Interesting. And the center has done very well over the years over at Columbia. And it’s been meeting its bills. [Laughter] And I’m having fun over there. I go over there.

COHEN: Oh, you go there.

CULLITY: I go there at least once a week.

COHEN: And Moore is still active in the…?

CULLITY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. He’s 77 years old.

COHEN: Oh wow.

CULLITY: And he is incredible. He does the work of eight 40-year-old guys. [Laughter] He’s remarkable. Yes. In fact I’m going to Budapest with him in late September. There’s a meeting with a group of economists over there. I’m only giving one paper. He’s giving two.

COHEN: So he’s one of these old guys who hasn’t mellowed? You talked about the old guys mellowing, but he—

CULLITY: No. You don’t dare get near him. He’s really a wonderful worker. It’s contagious. Anyone who gets near either has to work or else they have to leave. He had a couple of young secretaries working for him who had worked in other departments around Rutgers. And they were used to a more leisurely pace. Well, they were in the wrong office with him because he kept them moving all day long.

COHEN: How significant have Moore’s contributions been since he left Rutgers, in our estimation?

CULLITY: He continues to do enormous work. This is a guy whose work—now, I’m biased, so discount what I have to say.

COHEN: Well, no.

CULLITY: It’s of Nobel Laureate quality. There are guys who have won Nobel Laureates who haven’t done that kind of work. And since leaving Rutgers, he set up a whole bunch of signaling systems to signal increases in inflation rates and deceleration of inflation. He got involved in an enormous project that deals with financial markets.

COHEN: When you say signaling, you mean what I would understand as an economic indicator? Would that be true.
CULLITY: He uses economic indicators as signals. When they cross certain bands, there are pre-designated signals. As soon as a leading indicator crosses a certain point in terms of its growth, a flashing light goes on, a signal is sent: danger or better times ahead or whatever. And he’s developed a lot of those signaling systems. Signal systems of inflation, interest rates. Done a lot of work on stock markets, not only in the United States, in stock markets all around the world. Done a lot of work on metals. For example, he and I spent about a year, year and a half…it must be two years ago we did this. And we’ve developed leading indicators for the metals industries. And the Bureau of Mines is just this month coming out with the first edition of the new statistical manual dealing with the metals industries. And Moore and I did all the work on that.

COHEN: Oh, is that right!

CULLITY: Yes. And we did a lot of work the past couple of years on indicators for specific industries. We tried to put together indicators for retail trade, the apparel industry.

COHEN: What is the title of that metals publication, can you recall?

CULLITY: No, I don’t recall. Pat Devine of the Bureau of Mines called me two days ago. She said the first edition’s coming out. You’ll get a copy next week. I don’t even know what they’re going to call it.

COHEN: And your names are on it as coauthors?

CULLITY: I hope that they’re going to say we did the work on it.

COHEN: Yea, you never know how these things...

CULLITY: Yes. But he’s done a lot of work. And it continues in the same tradition: leading indicators, leading indicators, bam bam bam. And he expanded his databank to cover 11, 12 countries. We have a proposal right now to develop indicators for central Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia. Trying to get funding for that. And we’ll see how that goes. There are very few…I can’t think of one important industrial country where leading indicators haven’t been developed. And they were developed at Columbia Center, which was at one time the Rutgers Center. A lot of young people have learned business-cycle analysis working in these centers. When they were on campus, we had a number of our students working over there. And there are a lot of young people from Columbia who are doing it right now.

COHEN: Yes. I wanted to ask—During the seventies, I mean we get into the whole question of what we were just talking about, indicators and the use of computers. How did the curriculum in economics change, course content, the approaches, from the time that you started teaching, sixties or earlier, until, well, now.

CULLITY: I think a little more mathematics, some more mathematics.

COHEN: Only a little more?
CULLITY: On the undergraduate level, only a little more. On the graduate level, a lot more. Someone going into a graduate program in economics nowadays, darned well had better taken a lot of mathematics as an undergraduate. But an undergraduate would really only…. An undergraduate economics major can understand anything we’re doing.…

COHEN: Can’t.

CULLITY: CAN understand anything we’re doing on the undergraduate level, it seems to me, with courses in calculus. You needn’t know much more than that.

COHEN: What does an undergraduate major in 1963, when you started out here, consist of in the major, compared to what an undergraduate major would need today?

CULLITY: There’s very little difference. The only difference would be a course in econometrics. Back in 1963 it seems to me an economics major would have had six credits in intro, a micro course, some intermediate microeconomics course, intermediate macro course, a statistics course, and, you know, 18 or so elective credits. The only difference is that nowadays you would have—he’d have to take a three-credit course in econometrics. That’s the only difference I can see.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Yes. That’s interesting. Would you say that this is typical of the way—of the course and the development of the teaching of economics?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: In most colleges or universities?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: That there hasn’t been that much change.

CULLITY: It’s the standard. I think what we’re doing is standard.

COHEN: Yes. In graduate education?

CULLITY: Totally different. Totally different! You’ve just got to go in there with a very, very good mathematics background. When I went into Columbia in 1954, you didn’t need to know much mathematics.

COHEN: When did this change come about?

CULLITY: It was starting to occur—it started to occur in the late fifties.

COHEN: Why did it come about?
CULLITY: I think that the development of the discipline went in that direction. You got a lot of people who were interested in mathematics who got into economics. And the old guys, the turn-of-the-century people, like Marshall and so forth, were good mathematicians, but they kept all their mathematics in the appendixes. They were brought out of the appendixes and out of the footnotes, and they were put into the text. And so if you’re going to understand economics in the late 1950’s, sixties, seventies, if you’re going to understand the journals, you had to understand some mathematics, a lot of mathematics. There were young people who came into the field. You want to do something different. And mathematics is more elegant than maybe English. And it just came into the literature. Perhaps it had something to do with the development of the computer and large-scale computer models. But those large-scale computer models, which were the vogue in the 1960’s, late 1960’s, are out of fashion nowadays. The people who run them still make money out of them. But there isn’t any clear-cut evidence that they’re any more efficient at generating good forecasts than much smaller models.

COHEN: When you say larger models, you’re talking about macroeconomics?

CULLITY: Yes, yes, yes. And macroeconomics itself has had a real problem. The macroeconomists, the mainstream macroeconomists, had a lot of trouble with their forecasts. And so that’s a problem for them. A lot of people think that the best side of economics is micro, the micro side, that people learn certain skills in microeconomics that are very useful to them in business or in government or wherever the heck they go to work. And that’s come along considerably over the years. When I was…. In the fifties, it wasn’t fashionable at all, microeconomics. It is very fashionable nowadays.

COHEN: In the field, what is the role of ideology, left, right, in between ideology, in the development of the teaching of the subject and the research in the subject?

CULLITY: Well, it would be nice to believe—or it might be nice to believe—that economics is a value-free discipline. I don’t think that’s true. I’ve thought a lot about the question that you raise. And I don’t know that I have a good answer to the question that you raise. Economists are viewed by the rest of the academic community, or it seems to me we think we’re viewed, rather strangely. Or maybe it’s just our campus. I don’t know. At the last faculty meeting, one lady at the faculty meeting didn’t know the difference between economists and business people. And we laughed about that after we left the meeting. But this question of ideology is a tough one to deal with. I have tended to believe that economists are, by the nature of their discipline, conservative. I don’t want to resort to cliché—I think that we’re conservative—but I’m going to, I guess. I think we’re conservative because our training says that there’s always a cost. If you’re going to do this action, you’re going to take action A, then you can’t simultaneously take action B. There’s always a cost attaching to actions that you take. I think when you have that notion embedded in your head by your training, then you’re going to be conservative. You weigh, you start weighing, all the options. That makes you conservative. And I think we tend to be more conservative than people in other disciplines inside the university. But I read something recently that suggested that maybe I’m wrong. I’m not convinced by the survey. But there was a survey conducted by the American Enterprise Institute that’s in the current issue of the American Enterprise Institute’s magazine. And I looked it all of…[Break in recording]
COHEN: Okay, we’re back. We were talking about ideology and the economists.

CULLITY: This survey, as the American Enterprise Institute suggested, the bulk of academicians in the United States consider themselves to be liberal, middle-of-the-road, a minority moderately conservative, a very, very small minority conservative. And although there were differences between economics and the other disciplines, an awful lot of the economists also labeled themselves liberal, very liberal, middle-of-the-road, moderately—not too many—moderately conservative, and not too many conservative. There was a difference between economics and the other disciplines, but not as big a difference as I thought there would be. And I haven’t completely thought out what I learned by reading that survey. I want to look at it again, see if I can make any sense out of it. But it certainly does seem to contradict the judgment that I’ve had, have held for a long time, that economists are conservative by training. I know that my professors seemed to think that—some of my professors at any rate—seemed to think that we were by nature or by training conservatives. George Stigler, who taught at one time at Columbia and then later went to Chicago, Stigler wrote a number of articles on why economists are conservative.

COHEN: Oh.

CULLITY: So maybe Stigler was wrong. I don’t know.

COHEN: In what way did ideology, if at all, influence the development and politics of the Economics Department and the Business Department, if you will, on this campus?

CULLITY: The only…. Well, there was one area where we had an ideological problem. And that was with Austrian economics. Austrian economics is a discipline which focuses on the work of Austrian theorists. The best-known Austrian theorist is Friedrich Hayek. Hayek won a Nobel Prize in ’78 or so. The year Hayek won his Nobel Prize, the committee balanced off Hayek’s conservatism…. Hayek doesn’t consider himself a conservative, but the general public does. They balanced of Hayek’s prize by giving Gunnar Myrdal a Nobel Prize. So they had someone on the left and someone on the right to show their neutrality. But we had a problem. We had opportunities, and we had a problem with Austrian economics. There was a young fellow who graduated from Rutgers in Newark. His name is Richard Fink. I know for sure he studied with Stan Kaish as an undergraduate. Then he went out to UCLA, which had a very good—and still has a very good—economics department, one of the best in the country. And Richie got a master’s out there. And then for some reason he came back East and enrolled at NYU in their Ph.D. program. And he got a job—I didn’t hire Richie; I knew about him, but I didn’t hire him. I like him, and I still like him. Richie came on board, and he taught a course in Austrian economics. He also taught the regular intro economics course. Students liked him. They like him a lot. A good teacher. Well, Richie had something, some charisma there that Richie has, that attracts people who have enormous amounts of money. [Laughter] I wish I had it.

COHEN: What a gift!
CULLITY: I wish I had it. He managed to meet and attract in some way a guy by the name of Koch, K-O-C-H. And Mr. Koch is out in Kansas someplace. I’ve never met Mr. Koch. But he’s one of the—and not too many people meet him; I don’t know. But Koch is one of the wealthiest people in the United States. When Forbes does the 20 wealthiest or whatever, Koch is always one of the 20 wealthiest. His personal wealth is let’s say 10, 15 billion dollars. Forgetting the business stuff.

COHEN: Ah!

CULLITY: Well, Richie was into this Austrian economics, which focuses on Hayek’s work. Hayek is a free market guy. And what happened was Richie said, “Koch would like to give us some money if we could formalize a relationship.” He said, “I think I can get a lot of money from this guy.” And he sent a guy in. Koch’s representative was a fellow by the name of Pierson. Pierson came to me, and he said, “Mr. Koch would like to help Richie and people like Richie. And he wants—he would like, if you’re interested, if you guys would give in the course of a year a course in Austrian economics in the fall and in the spring.” A three-credit course in the fall, and a three-credit course in the spring. “And we’ll be able to help the department in many, many ways.” Scholarships to students, able students and so forth. Moneys for seminars and so forth and so on. Ah, terrific! Richie was hired, again. I think he was already on our staff when this proposal came in. I don’t know whether we hired another guy, Salerno. Salerno was a friend of Richie’s. But as I recall it, and I might be wrong, the deal was one course per semester. Salerno—when I think about Salerno, I don’t know whether Salerno was part of that story, too; I don’t know. At any rate, I think we got, over the course of the next two years, something in the neighborhood of $200,000 from this Koch Foundation, which we used for all kinds of different purposes. Two kids were brought in. One was a fellow by the name of Tyler Cowan. He was the high school chess champion in New Jersey. Very, very smart guy. Then another gal heard about our program, our program in Austrian economics, two courses in spring and fall. This gal came in from Nebraska. She was given a scholarship out of Koch Foundation money. I think her name was Kathy Curtis. We set up seminar programs. We invited people who had all kinds of different political ideologies. And we had you name it. You name all the stars in economics in the late seventies, early eighties.

COHEN: Samuelson?

CULLITY: No, we didn’t have Samuelson, but we had Martin Feldstein. We had Gottfried Haberler. We had James Buchanan. We had a whole bunch of guys, eight of nine biggies. They were in, they gave lectures. We set up a conference, a three-day conference, over at the Gateway.

COHEN: On the subject of—

CULLITY: Economics. What’s going on in the economy?

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: And we were doing awfully well. And I think that injured us.
COHEN: That conference?

CULLITY: No, the conference didn’t injure us. But the fact that we’d established this relationship in some way might have injured us with faculty members. I know that Eva Hirsch was unhappy. She didn’t like this idea at all. And I think the fact that we had these two courses in Austrian economics was used in arguments against us. These guys are wasting resources. They’ve got two courses in Austrian economics, which is not in the mainstream. And that’s true—that was true. But it was also true that we were getting $100,000 or more a year from these people for other programs that were helping the department enormously. Well, at any rate, what happened was that it ended fast. Richard Fink did not have his Ph.D. yet. He was finishing a Ph.D. at NYU. And he was getting flak from the administration. He hadn’t had his Ph.D. And if he didn’t get his Ph.D., then he would have to be terminated and so forth and so on. And he got these letters.

COHEN: He would have taught the course?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: He was vital to the whole thing. So at one point he just simply said to us, “I don’t need this aggravation. I’ll leave.” And he quit. And that was the end of the relationship. When he went, Mr. Koch went. And all that money went out the window. Richard went down to George Mason University and brought all that money down there with him. And a lot more. And George Mason has a big program of that character down there right now. And probably it’s on the list of the top 20 graduate programs. It has a Ph.D. program in economics now. It’s in the top 20. And Richie Fink has gone onto much bigger things since then. But that was the end of that. There was an ideological problem.

COHEN: Now what was the…where was the source of the main opposition to the program in the faculty generally either within the Economics Department or outside the Economics Department?

CULLITY: Inside the department I know for sure that Eva didn’t like it. Perhaps Beth Nemi, who was on our faculty at that time. Beth died young. I think maybe Beth didn’t like it, although she never was vocal on that matter. As far as the rest of the department’s concerned, we were just happy as hell that it was around because it meant that there were resources that were coming into the department that were making life a lot nicer for everyone in the department.

COHEN: What was the basis, the intellectual basis, for the opposition to the….

CULLITY: Well, I think in Eva’s case the problem was that Eva probably wanted to hire people who were more liberal.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Yes.
CULLITY: And it was her perception that we had too many people who were conservative. I don’t know. Maybe we were. But our perception was that we were mainstream.

COHEN: During that period—I want to touch on the development of the faculty. In the seventies, the whole question of talking about faculty and differences. The whole question of tenure seemed to have been a bigger issue, at least on the floor of the meetings, of the faculty, tenure and publication. You mentioned earlier in your narration about being told by Helen Cook that in 1963 the faculty was expected to produce. How did that develop in the seventies, to what extent?

CULLITY: I think those who followed Helen—Leo, Stan, me—I think that we learned from Helen. And whenever we had a young person in the department, we tended to say the same thing to that person: Hey, if you’re not going to publish, there’s very little we can do for you. It won’t work. We can’t get you through the committee. We’ll never get you tenure. You’ve got to publish. And we—you’ve asked me a darned good question. I’m trying to go back to the large number of people, young people, we had who came in and then left, boom boom boom. Never got tenure. There were plenty of them. They weren’t able to do it.

COHEN: You’re talking about the department or the faculty in general?

CULLITY: In the department, yes, yes. What’s happening in the other departments, I don’t know.

COHEN: Yes, yes. How did you see the claim that and insistence on scholarship, publication, grants and so on would cause, oh, some loss in the teaching department? That teaching would suffer as a result of this emphasis?

CULLITY: Well, I’ve talked with Stan Kaish about this a lot. And Stan and I generally agree on 99 percent of the things that we talk about. But on this one, I’m different from Stan. Stan has believed—and I understand his arguments—that we should be primarily a teaching faculty and that should be it. That’s the main criterion for promotion. Can this guy do a good job in the classroom? And forget the research. I’m a traditionalist. I think that there’s no reason why someone cannot be both a good teacher and a good researcher. I know that the game isn’t played that way in this university and hasn’t been played that way all along. Nonetheless, I think you can have good…. I think to be a really good university teacher, you should be involved in research in some way. It keeps you abreast of what the heck is going on. I’m sure you can be an all right teacher without doing research. I think it can be done. But I think what you want in a university is both. And I have too many good examples at Columbia of people who were both terrific researchers and terrific teachers. You shouldn’t keep a guy around if he’s a dreadful teacher. You shouldn’t be doing that. But that does go on. I think a lot about this question that you’re talking about. I have to serve on a committee this fall, an A & P committee. And I’m concerned about the question of what do you do with a guy who is a terrific researcher, who is not a good teacher? That ought to be brought out in the appointments and promotions process. People ought to be diligent on that point. If you’ve got a good researcher and the guy is a dreadful teacher, you’ve got to take that into account. I don’t think we’ve been taking that into
account. Or I don’t think the university has sufficiently taken that into account. Because I think we’ve got inside our university a lot of bum teachers who are good researchers.

COHEN: On this campus, this college, what was done in the seventies and into the eighties to come up with a better system of evaluating the teaching abilities of the faculty?

CULLITY: I’ll tell you. I’ve never placed enormous stress on student evaluations. I don’t know. I just don’t know how good they are. You can get a lot of people who are very nice people who get fine evaluations who I don’t think are good teachers. They’re just nice people, and the students like them. I don’t know. I think that there are ways of evaluating teachers, but we’ve never been willing to do the job. Let me illustrate. My first job as a teacher was over at St. Peter’s back in 1955. It was and is a Catholic school, Jesuit school. They had a procedure. The procedure was that the dean would write you a note and say, Is it possible for me to come and sit in on your class and listen for 20 minutes or a half hour or so? Let me know if there’s a date that’s convenient for you. So the dean does show up in the classroom at the appointed time. I remember the dean coming into the classroom. The dean himself was an experienced teacher. Comes into the classroom, sits in the back, takes notes. Then three weeks later, two or three weeks later, calls you down to his office, and you have a nice informal chat for a half hour, 45 minutes. He tells you things about yourself that you didn’t know: You have this mannerism that you keep on repeating the end of the sentence over and over again. [Laughter] Or you don’t make eye contact with the students. Or this. Have you thought that when you’re in the classroom, when a student asks a question, you walk right toward him so that you can hear him better? And the other kids on the other side of the classroom can’t hear what’s going on between you two? They had a number of devices like that in that school. They had an inspector general who toured all of the Jesuit colleges in the New York area, and that was his task, to evaluate young people and to assist them.

COHEN: Just teach them.

CULLITY: Just on their teaching. On their teaching.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: There are things you can do. We never do those things.

COHEN: Do you think that the teaching has improved on the campus in the years you’ve been here or declined, the quality of the teaching? Any opinions on that at all?

CULLITY: I don’t know. I don’t know. It’d be just speculation. And dreaming. Oh, they were better in those days than they are now. These kids, they don’t know what the hell they’re doing. Maybe they do. Here’s a case this semester: We’re firing the best teacher in the department. [Laughs] We have a young guy who just got his Ph.D. We don’t have a line for him. We’re firing him.

COHEN: The line was pulled?
CULLITY: We lost a line.

COHEN: Right.

CULLITY: He had the lowest seniority.

COHEN: Oh, boy! Still on the subject of teaching, what have been some of your memorable teaching experiences, that you can recall?

CULLITY: As far as teaching experiences, I don’t know how good or bad I am. But I always—I think I can say accurately, I always come to class prepared. And I spend a lot of time on preparation. And I have a model that I’ve had since I was a young guy, and the model is Arthur Burns. He was the greatest teacher I ever encountered anyplace. Incredible teacher! And Burns…Burns was totally structured when he came into a classroom. He knew exactly where he was going to be. The minute he walked in, he knew where he’d be 45 minutes, 50 minutes down the line, and he had the entire lecture, three or four points. That’s all he’d cover anyplace, three or four points. Boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. But he was remarkably prepared. And I read a story about Burns once. Burns taught at Rutgers many, many years ago in the thirties.

COHEN: Chairman of the Federal Reserve was he then?

CULLITY: He became president of the…. Well, after leaving Rutgers, he became professor at Columbia. Then he became chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Eisenhower. Then he became president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Then he became chairman of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System. And he ended up in his eighties still working. He was US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. And he started out as the son of a house painter over in Bayonne, New Jersey. And there are some interesting stories there. But Burns was totally prepared. And I read this story once about him: When he was down at Rutgers, he said that he spent six years in the evening studying Marshall’s Principles of Economics, going over so many pages a night. And if you heard Burns give a lecture on Marshall, you knew what Marshall was about. And after he’d finished Marshall’s Principles of Economics, he spent a number of years studying Keynes’s general theory. And I don’t think I’ve ever encountered anyone who explained Keynes better than Burns, although he was an anti-Keynesian. And Burns was really an outstanding model because even if he disagreed with a point of view, he would put the best light on a particular theory.

If Burns was lecturing on Keynes, he would present it as Keynes wanted it presented. And he’d make the argument as strong as he possibly could. And he let it be. And he’d present it day, after day, after day, presenting a theory that he disagreed with. No critical comment. Then he would get…he would say, “Okay. Now it’s time for me to make some critical comment on this. Okay. Here’s the way I view it. Here’s the theory. Here are my problems with it.” One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. But he always gave his opponents a fair shot. And I think that some of that is missing in our universities nowadays. I think that maybe ideology is playing too big a role, and some people are too attached to their ideologies, and it’s creeping into lectures that it perhaps shouldn’t be. Just teach, teach the material as best you can. Okay. You’ve got some
things that are bugging you. Okay. There’ll come a time when you should present your criticism of this or that. But teach the matter fairly.

COHEN: Well, you’ve been teaching the matter fairly for many years. And I was wondering, could you recall any of your outstanding students during this time?

CULLITY: Yes. Oh, goodness.

COHEN: Their career and where they went?

CULLITY: Well, I had dinner with one of them…Leo and I had dinner with one of them about three weeks ago. It was the first year, and the fellow was in my class the first year I got here in ’63. It’s a fellow by the name of Donald Gottheimer. He’s a very successful businessman. There was a fellow in the sixties, late sixties, by the name of Joe Gallagher, who was a very strong student. This fellow Tyler Cowan was one of my students. I mentioned him before in connection with the Austrian program. He’s the fellow who came in on scholarship. He was a brilliant young guy. And Tyler has a Ph.D. from Harvard in economics and is publishing like crazy in good journals really now. I had a lot of good research assistants. A lot of them just in business, law, dentistry, all different fields. I’m sure I’m doing a disservice to some good ones by not remembering them. Richard Conjure was one of my students. And Richard Conjure is a big executive with Lipton Company nowadays. There’s a fellow by the name of Mike Namara [sp]. I got Mike Namara interested in business cycles. And Mike Namara [sp] is a researcher now with Mitsubishi. He does a lot of business-cycle work. Phil Goodman was one of my students. And Phil is in advertising. He’s in—I can’t think of the name of the firm right now. A young gal I had as a research assistant, Angela Feminan [sp] is an attorney now. Another guy who was one of my students in the late sixties. He’s an economist with the Conference Board now. The name escapes me. Over time we’ve turned out a lot of economists. One of Leo’s students I knew very well was Brian Freedman. He became a fine lawyer. [End of Tape #2]

COHEN: We’re back with Dr. Cullity. Oh, we were talking about outstanding students of yours.

CULLITY: Yes. And I almost overlooked perhaps the most outstanding student I’ve had at Rutgers, and her name is Debbie Fieldhouse. Debbie graduated about two years ago, and she was terrific. Went four years straight A. Valedictorian. And I had Debbie for three or four courses. Terrific student. And in fact she did her honors paper with me. And she did a super job on an honors project involving the thrift industry and the deterioration of credit quality inside the thrift industry in the early eighties. And it was a super job.

COHEN: Was she the student who was on the Courses of Study Committee?

CULLITY: Could have been. And she was on a lot of committees.

COHEN: Yes, I think I….

CULLITY: We thought that maybe she’d go on to graduate school and become an economist. But she wasn’t interested in that. She went out and she has a job someplace. And that’s that.
COHEN: Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: And she’s I think engaged to a young physician. So I think she’s doing okay.

COHEN: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. The question—talking about students, I was wondering if you could comment on the level of preparation of the students that you had in your courses through the sixties into the seventies, through the seventies. A sense of changes during that period. Writing skills, mathematical skills, general preparation of students.

CULLITY: Some people in my department will say it’s gone downhill. I don’t see it. There were those who were inadequately prepared in the sixties, the seventies, and they are still around. There are those who are very adequately prepared. Take two cases, and there’s another young woman whom it didn’t occur to me to mention before. In the late sixties you could take Sharon Smith who was one of my students. Sharon Smith is right now, by the way, dean at Fordham University School of Business. Sharon Smith. Brilliant girl. Brilliant woman. Right now Debbie Fieldhouse, 20 years later, probably is as good as Sharon. They come around year after year. You don’t get a Debbie Fieldhouse or a Sharon Smith every year. But every three, four years, five years, you find someone like that. And then you find those who aren’t prepared.

What I think you have to do—and as I told you earlier, I’m a little unhappy with my own performance in the spring 1990—one semester, this past semester, I didn’t do as well as I should. But I’m going to make up for it this time. What I think you have to do is make it unmistakably clear to the students that first day in class that you do have standards. And that you’re going to stick with your standards. And if they’re not happy, then they should find another teacher. Maybe there’s someone around here somewhere where they can be happy—or in someone’s class they can be happy. They’re not going to be happy in your class because you have standards and you’re going to apply those standards. And those who stay will be embarrassed. You don’t want to embarrass anybody. But they’ll be embarrassed if they do stay. I think if you do that, you’re going to find that during the ad/drop period, there’ll be a number of people who will drop the course. Where they will go, I don’t know. But you won’t have them in your class.

COHEN: What effect did you see in the early seventies, particularly after the takeover of Conklin and the settlements, on the level of preparation of the students, admissions standards, in your experience?

CULLITY: I didn’t change my standards one bit. I think I’m applying the same standards now that I did before then.

COHEN: How about the students that came into your classes? Did you have any sense of where they were coming from as far as preparation is concerned? Did you have any difficulties?

CULLITY: No, Gil. You know my position is that I think they’re as good nowadays as they were before. Others disagree with me on this. They say I’m wrong. Maybe I am. But I just am not—I don’t believe I am. I’m not picking that up. I think I’m applying the same standards.
COHEN: Do you have any sense of the effectiveness of the Academic Foundations Department in preparing or remediating students in need of remediation for college curriculum?

CULLITY: I have only a very vague impression there. It seems to me that a large portion of the kids who would go through the Academic Foundations Program are these black youngsters. An awful lots of those youngsters are in trouble in introductory economics. It’s tragic. I feel terrible after the first exam. Many of those youngsters, it’s a 38, 40, 42 grade, 44, whatever. That’s sad. And you see the hurt in their eyes, and you feel rotten about it. Now, I don’t know what the Academic Foundations people have to work with, the level to start with. Maybe they are doing something good. I don’t know.

COHEN: Talking about student life—students—what changes did you see in student life…first in the area of general social relations among students, the freedom, the new freedom of students, social freedom, sexual freedom. What shifts did you see in the sixties, seventies?

CULLITY: I’ll tell you. I think in the sixties it was awful.

COHEN: In what respect?

CULLITY: I would see students, our students, walking around, some of them spaced out. I saw students around here spaced out. They were on drugs or something.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: And I don’t see that much anymore.

COHEN: Anymore.

CULLITY: Maybe it’s there and I’m missing it. But I don’t see that. It was apparent to me that there were kids on drugs in our classrooms. Now I see some—I do see some unusual things even today, nowadays. In one of my classes I saw this—not in my own class, but as I was preparing to leave my class and the next group is coming in to take over the classroom—I looked at this one lady last semester taking a course, I think she’s a bag lady, homeless, a homeless person.

COHEN: Yes, yes.

CULLITY: And I learned from some friends over in business that indeed that was the case. And I learned from the dean of students that that was indeed the case.

COHEN: Enrolled?

CULLITY: Enrolled in classes. And, you know, you wonder what her mental condition might be. I don’t know. But these kids in general, they’re in and out as—here’s our student body: They come in, they go to class, they’re gone. The kids who come in, a lot of them have jobs. They’re working 20 hours, 25 hours or whatever a week. They’re …In and out, boom, boom, boom. As far as social life, there is no social life. I’ve talked with them about this.
COHEN: What do they say?

CULLITY: There is none. No, no, we have our friends elsewhere. The kids who come from Bayonne or Jersey City, they have friends over at St. Peter’s or this place or that place. The kids who come from Montclair, have friends up at Montclair State or wherever. There is no social life on this campus. That’s an exaggeration. But it is negligible.

COHEN: Was it any different in the seventies or the sixties?

CULLITY: No, no, no. I have the vague impression that there was a little more social activity, maybe a little more interest even before I got here. I lived in the neighborhood. I lived in Jersey City, and I knew about Rutgers in Newark. I had friends who went to school here. And they at least had an athletic program. Rutgers-Newark had a decent basketball team in the 1950’s. And in fact I think as late as 1960 or somewhere around there, they had a basketball team that beat the New Brunswick basketball team. That was the last time they played. New Brunswick never played them again. [Laughter] No, they had some sort of a basketball program. This school has nothing in terms of an athletic program. Volleyball team. Very few people play volleyball. And basketball has improved a little bit in the past year or two. But the basketball program was the worst in the nation. [Laughs] You know those poor kids were out there losing game after game after game year after year. It was terrible what was happening to them. There was something wrong going on, and there is something wrong.

COHEN: Do you have any sense in the period you were here of any changing relations between minority students and white students, black students, white students? Any sense of changing—

CULLITY: I don’t know. There was a lot of hostility between whites and blacks back in that period around the takeover.

COHEN: The takeover, yes.

CULLITY: I know that there was at that time hostility. You probably read in the newspaper accounts at the time, the Observer and the others, about the white kids wanting to break into the building and retake it and things like that. So there was hostility there. I don’t know that there’s much hostility anymore. Maybe there still is. I don’t know.

COHEN: Is that your perception?

CULLITY: No, I think that both groups stick with each other, you know what I mean. There’s very little social activity between the groups. There was more— When I was a kid in college, we had a lot of interaction white and black kids. We used to go out when I was in school, we’d go out to a place out in the Meadowlands on Friday night, white and black students. And we’d dance to a jukebox and have a pitcher of beer or whatever it was. We talked with each other. We socialized with each other. Maybe these kids are doing it now. I don’t think so.
COHEN: Yes, on the subject of race relations, I want to move into the area of affirmative action hiring in the faculty. How was that done in the—compare, let’s say, the sixties and then into the seventies. What changes were there in the methods of reaching minority candidates?

CULLITY: As far as affirmative action was concerned, let’s take the case of women.

COHEN: Okay. And that’s the other group. Half of the question…

CULLITY: Because we can get that out of the way faster.

COHEN: Sure.

CULLITY: Then we’ll get to the other area.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: We should never have had any trouble in the area of women. In Economics we had let’s say in mid-seventies, we had 12 economists on the staff. Of the 12, three or four, for of them, were women. We had Helen Cook, Beth Nemi, Eva Hirsch. We had a young lady by the name of Izrati [sp]. I’ve forgotten her first name. And we tried—I tried to hire Sharon Smith, who I mentioned before, is now the dean of Fordham University’s School of Business. She got—that was an actual case where she was being discriminated against, and she wasn’t going to put up with it. And she didn’t come onboard.

COHEN: How was she being discriminated against?

CULLITY: What happened was this: Sharon was a graduate of New Brunswick, Ph.D. program in New Brunswick. Peter Loeb was also a graduate from New Brunswick. Peter and Sharon were in the program at about the same time. We hired Peter since Peter was a year ahead of Sharon; hired Peter as 12,000. Sharon knew what Peter was getting. We wanted to hire Sharon the next year. She told me before we went to see the dean—the faculty doesn’t set the salary; the dean sets the salary. She said, “Jack, I want to come, I want to join you folks, but I will not take less than $12,000 a year.” And so she knew what Peter had gotten. So I went down to Mr. Robey, who was our dean, told him the situation. And we interviewed Sharon. She’s very good, bright and intelligent. Nice looking, the whole bit. So I leave, and they talked salary. So he says, “$11,750. And she said, “I don’t think so.” She leaves. Came back upstairs and she told me what it was she was offered. And I got on the phone. And I said, “Sharon, could you step outside just a second. I want to talk to this guy.” And so I called, and I said, “$11,000.” I told him she wouldn’t come for less than 12,000.

COHEN: Robey?

CULLITY: Yes. Robey says, “Oh, she’ll come for $11,750.” I said, “She will not.” And here was a case of $250 [laughter]

COHEN: This was in the seventies?
CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: This was a full-time appointment?

CULLITY: Yes, yes, yes.

COHEN: I can’t remember…..

CULLITY: Oh, yes, yes. Well, Sharon, instead of coming, she said so-long. And she went her own way. And she went down to Princeton and worked with Al Reis on a postdoc for 15,000, no teaching at all. [Laughs] Okay. So we never had any trouble. My point is as far as women in the department, we had much higher than the average percentage, and we had no problem hiring and so forth. Now as far as blacks were concerned, this sure was a problem in the early seventies because there weren’t many blacks who had Ph.D.’s. There had to be just a handful of these individuals across the nation. And they just weren’t going to get them. But nonetheless, what we had to do was—and indeed we did—follow the university guidelines. We advertised in the journals. We indicated that we were looking, we were an affirmative action employer, etc., etc. Blah blah blah. But we weren’t getting any applications. And we finally hired a black fellow in the eighties, James Peoples. Good guy. Came in from University of California at Berkeley.

COHEN: Had his doctorate?

CULLITY: Had his doctorate. But Jim—I shouldn’t call him Jim. James never…he’d gotten through his doctorate fast. He hadn’t learned yet how to do research. He hadn’t completely mastered that. And secondly, he was very much interested, highly interested, in spending a lot of time with the students. So here he shows up on the scene in a place where you have to publish.

COHEN: What year is this again, roughly?

CULLITY: He left us about two years ago.

COHEN: Oh!

CULLITY: So he probably got here around ’83, ’84, something like that.

COHEN: Oh! Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: James was having trouble with his research, getting it right, getting articles accepted. He managed to get two or three articles accepted in good journals. But that wasn’t going to do it for him. He had to have more than that. And so we just couldn’t get him tenure. He was a guy that the department wanted to keep. But we could not get Jim his tenure because he just hadn’t had the research output yet. He’s out at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee now. James has learned how to do research. And I’ll bet he must have published four or five articles in the past year, year and a half. So he’s going to do okay. But we just— Things were
just not right, and we couldn’t keep him onboard. But it’s very hard. It’s been very hard to recruit black Ph.D.’s. There just aren’t many around.

COHEN: Has anyone else come through the department?

CULLITY: Hispanic.

COHEN: Hispanic?

CULLITY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

COHEN: Carlos—

CULLITY: We have Carlos Seiglie right now. We just got an Hispanic, Cuban. He has a—he got his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. We’re hopeful that Carlos is going to make it. He’s sort of done things backwards. He’s had two or three articles already published before his Ph.D.

COHEN: Oh!

CULLITY: And so I think he’s going to get—I think he’ll get tenure. But it’s been a problem for us, no question about it.

COHEN: Yes, yes. Talking about, I want to again sort of stay in the area of faculty, if I may go back. The charge is frequently made that because of the relatively weaker support facilities on this campus, whether it’s libraries or labs, that the demand for production, research production, on the part of the faculty here at a level comparable to New Brunswick is not fair. How do you address this?

CULLITY: That might be the case in some of the hard sciences where they need a lot of capital equipment. I don’t think it’s the case in economics. I think right now we can be as productive as the New Brunswick people are. And I think maybe we are. I’m not sure of that. We were a very small department in economics. There are only eight or nine now. But everyone’s producing. And I don’t see lack of facilities as an impediment to our research.

COHEN: For instance library facilities compare?

CULLITY: No. Look, if you folks don’t have something in Dana, the library facilities are good enough that you can get it in an interlibrary loan. And I’ve done that. If it’s not in Dana, it’s probably down in Alexander or someplace else. And, sure, we don’t have the collection of books in Dana that they have down in Alexander. It’s not as big. Obviously. But that doesn’t mean you can’t get the book that you want. You may have a little delay. As far as economists are concerned, a lot of it is databanks. And there’s no reason why someone sitting in his office can’t access databanks wherever they exist, and it won’t be very expensive. It isn’t very expensive doing it. So I don’t think economists can claim, can legitimately claim, that it’s lack of facilities that is impeding anyone’s research.
COHEN: Let’s go back let’s say into the late sixties and seventies, before everybody had his own PC, his desk and his modem. I mean how valid was—

CULLITY: Might have been.

COHEN: …was the point then?

CULLITY: Maybe. Maybe it was, maybe there was more validity to it. But, you know, in Newark here, back in the sixties at any rate, I found if I couldn’t get something in Dana, I could go to Newark Public Library, too, which was a good library.

COHEN: Okay.

CULLITY: I think the people often make up excuses for the lack of drive. They lack drive and willingness to get to the task. If you’re an economist, you can do good economics in Newark. There’s no question about it. You can do it wherever the hell you are nowadays.

COHEN: You have a computer in your office?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: With a modem?

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: When did you get this equipment, roughly?

CULLITY: About three years ago?

COHEN: Oh, so we’re talking late eighties.

CULLITY: Yes. We were lucky. That equipment was paid for out of the Morris Beck Fund.

COHEN: Well, this is— Oh.

CULLITY: Morris left us some of that.

COHEN: He left?

CULLITY: Yes. Left us a sum of money.

COHEN: I see.

CULLITY: That we’ve used for some of this stuff.
COHEN: I see.

CULLITY: And thank God. We wouldn’t have had that stuff without Morris.

COHEN: Yes.

CULLITY: It was terrific.

COHEN: What databases do you access?

CULLITY: I use mostly the stuff that’s over at the Center for Business Cycles. They have a big database dealing with International Economic Indicators, leading indicators, coinciding indicators, that type of thing.

COHEN: Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: Yes. The Citibase is an important source.

COHEN: Citibase?

CULLITY: Citibase. But I use… Citibase as a service that comes out of Citibank.

COHEN: Oh.

CULLITY: Citibase is an enormous statistical database, one of the biggest.

COHEN: Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: And it just has hundreds, maybe thousands, thousands of time series, all of the important time series dealing with the US economy are in Citibase. And it’s a very, very powerful, that series.

COHEN: You have any use for any of the databases in the Dana Library which we have on a CD-ROM?

CULLITY: I don’t know…. No, I don’t know what you have over there, Gil. I’ve been meaning to get in and have a session. I use the library more than most.

COHEN: Oh, wow!

CULLITY: Most people. I’ve wanted to talk to Al, and there’s a young lady named Roberta?

COHEN: Yes, Roberta Tipton is one of the business librarians.
CULLITY: Those two. We’ve mentioned talking about the library. You’ve got two really good young….[Break in recording] Well, it’s an important decision; involved, a lot, a lot of money, capital. I’m not sure it was the right decision.

COHEN: Your assessment of Edward Bloustein’s administration?

CULLITY: I think that Bloustein wanted to make this into a first-class research institution. I think that was his vision.

COHEN: You said this, is that Rutgers generally.

CULLITY: Rutgers generally.

COHEN: Okay.

CULLITY: What his vision for Newark was is not clear. Certainly if you go back to 1970 or ’71 or so, that’s about the time that Ed Bloustein became president. You’ll find in the first three or four—the first year or so—there was a book that covers the lectures that Ed Bloustein gave to different groups inside the university. And he made a big, big issue out of making Rutgers a great urban university, emphasis on urban. And he may have had some sort of vision of what he could do in Newark. But that dimmed, I think, over the years. He became more and more interested in the New Brunswick operation. I don’t know whether I’m being fair to him on that.

COHEN: Oh, that’s—

CULLITY: This is my perception.

COHEN: That’s you perception, and that’s—I think it’s very important.

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: As far as the Newark administration is concerned, what are your perceptions of Malcolm Talbott’s contributions as vice president of the Newark campus. He was acting dean of the college during the most difficult period. What could you say about his contributions?

CULLITY: Malcolm Talbott was a very likable individual. Had a lot of conversations with him. Always found him to be a very friendly person. I was not privy to the negotiations that went on after the student takeover. That’s when Malcolm was acting dean. Some of the people who were there at the time were critical and thought he was not strong enough.

COHEN: Strong in what sense?

CULLITY: They believed that there was some watering down, there was going to be some watering down in the quality of the work done by the student body. And somehow in the back of my mind I remember that they had arrived at some sort of a decision, Malcolm and the others had arrived at some sort of decision, that students who came through Rutgers would get a true
Rutgers degree, whatever the heck a true Rutgers degree means. Those who were involved in the negotiations felt that that was some sort of a phony formulation that was disguising a watering down of quality. Maybe Malcolm was smarter than the rest of us and realized that you give away some things in the shortfall, and then you take them back later on. Lawyers may have that kind of perception. And maybe that was something he was on to. As far as running the vice president’s office, I had no firsthand encounters with Malcolm. He was a guy I sort of liked. Yes. An all right guy.

COHEN: The deans, starting with Herbert Woodward. You mentioned him briefly.

CULLITY: He’s an almost mythical character. [Laughter] No one ever saw him. I’ve forgotten a lot about him. But I remember I think the first day I arrived. I think this is true. He talked to all the new professors. A whole bunch of us were there. Stan Kaish was there, George Parakopolus [sp]. I think Marie Collins was in the class that I was in. And I don’t know. He got in there—I think this is when he told us—he’d been an OSS man right at the end of World War II.

COHEN: Office of Strategic Services.

CULLITY: Yes. And he had been sent to Bulgaria, someplace like that, to find out whether the Bulgarians were better off than the Greeks. Who had the higher standard of living? And so he came back with his report, and he said that the Greeks definitely had a higher standard of living than the Bulgarians. And his bosses wanted to know how he arrived at that conclusion. And he said, “Oh, I arrived at that conclusion because I never saw a cat in Bulgaria.” [Laughs] So that’s the only Herbert Woodward story I know. Obviously a very scientific way of approaching the whole matter.

COHEN: As an economist that wasn’t lost on you.

CULLITY: No, no. This guy’s on to something. [Laughter] Who knows about Herbert Woodward? I don’t know.

COHEN: Ok. That way you just added something to the record. [Laughter] His successor was William Gilliland, another geologist.

CULLITY: I think he was a nice guy. He was a very nice person. And he was…I think he liked the Economics Department. I think we did well when Gilliland was dean. He sort of liked us, and we got a couple of lines out of him. And that was that. But, you know, he was a geologist also, just like Woodward. And I don’t know how the heck that coincidence occurred. But I sort of suspect what was happening. But he was not the guy for the politics of Newark in the late sixties. I think he was too gentle an individual. He couldn’t survive.

COHEN: How would you characterize his politics?

CULLITY: Oh, you know, after you’ve had a situation in the streets where 30-some people lose their lives and so forth, it’s a turbulent atmosphere, and lot of hatred and animosity and anger. It’s all over the place, a feeling of exploitation and so forth and so on. And here’s a fellow comes
in from Nebraska, or wherever he came from, someplace, I don’t think he was equipped to handle a situation like Newark.

COHEN: But how does that feeling, that general—you just mentioned these feelings that existed in the community—how did that impact on faculty relations on the campus?

CULLITY: It began to impact, in the area we were talking about earlier, with the students. Obviously it spilled over onto the students who.... And there might have been some community activists, probably were community activists, who were pushing the students to take action, to try to make Rutgers a more community-oriented institution.

COHEN: So the pressures are already in the office there because he left office as dean.

CULLITY: Yes. I don’t know what he—

COHEN: Before the takeover.

CULLITY: I would imagine so. I can’t even remember why Gilliland was replaced. I don’t know.

COHEN: You have no recollection of that?

CULLITY: I have no recollection.

COHEN: But you really feel that someone in that position was already under those pressures?

CULLITY: Yes. I don’t think he was the right guy for this kind of job. No, no.

COHEN: Okay. And then he was followed by Malcolm Talbott as the acting dean—

CULLITY: That’s right.

COHEN: —of the College of Arts and Sciences. Well, maybe if you can separate Talbott’s contributions as vice president from the dean of the college, do you have any sense of that?

CULLITY: No, he was a Newark person. I think he was a fighter for Newark.

COHEN: Now when you say he was a Newark person, how do you mean that?

CULLITY: I think when he went down to New Brunswick, I think he tried to fight for Newark and to try to get resources into Newark.

COHEN: Yes.
CULLITY: I think that he and Haeckel were very, very close friends. Willard was the dean of the law school, and Malcolm was a professor of law. I think they were good friends. And they may even have shared an apartment on—

COHEN: I believe, yea…Mount Prospect.

CULLITY: Mount Prospect. I think I was there once. Yes. And I think that they were both Newark persons and tried to fight for Newark.

COHEN: Yes, yes. Henry Blumenthal was the first dean on this new campus after Malcolm Talbott left as acting dean.

CULLITY: Yes, yes, yes.

COHEN: And how would you assess his administration?

CULLITY: I think he was efficient. Henry had this Germanic background, and I guess he’d gone to college or university…. No, he’d taken his Ph.D. out at California, University of California at Berkeley. But before that I think all of his education was probably over in—maybe it was over the continent. Maybe in Berlin. I don’t know. He was sort of very rigid. He knew exactly what he wanted. He had his own vision of how the world operated. I know he was a super teacher. The word I had from the students was that Blumenthal was one of the best teachers on campus. Hardworking. He’s a single guy, no family. Totally committed to the university. Put a lot of time in. If anything was screwy, it wasn’t because he wasn’t around. He was here. He was the first one here in the morning. He was in his office at seven-thirty or eight o’clock in the morning. And he was here until late afternoon. Had some backbone. I don’t know. I thought that…. Henry was very good to me and treated me very nicely. And I think he did a pretty good job as dean. I think he could have been a little stronger during the days when we had the Vietnam troubles. I thought he was a little weak on one or two occasions. I’m talking about I guess 1970, right after Kent State.

COHEN: Yes. Cambodia.

CULLITY: And we had to close down early.

COHEN: Oh, yes.

CULLITY: That year. I don’t quarrel with the closing down; maybe that was the right thing to do. But I think that some of those faculty meetings were allowed to degenerate. They were sort of chaotic. And, well, I disagreed with Henry on a couple of things there.

COHEN: What areas did you?

CULLITY: I just didn’t that the faculty should be voting on how to conduct foreign policy.

COHEN: Mm-hmm.
CULLITY: And that’s what they were doing. We had no expertise in the area of foreign policy, and we were making all these—passing resolutions on things we knew nothing about. And it was just a chaotic atmosphere at times. Big posters all around the place with pictures of the president of the United States and blood all over his hands and this, that, and the other thing. I don’t think you should conduct faculty meetings in such an environment. I didn’t think so at the time. But Henry went ahead and did that. But generally I thought he did a good job.

COHEN: What did the student activism of the anti-Vietnam war and student activism do to relations among faculty?

CULLITY: I think it poisoned them some more. I think that helped poison people, attitudes. We had a dickens of a time selecting a dean after Henry. It must have taken two years, the search process, because there were these splits.

COHEN: Why do you think he left after a relatively short tenure of just about two years?

CULLITY: I don’t know. Maybe his age. Maybe he was tired. Maybe he had other things to do, book to write or something like that. It was probably just aggravating. Maybe he was getting aggravated by the whole thing. Do I need this? And it’s enough. Very simple, I think. But he only lasted a few years.

COHEN: Two. I understand it was relatively short notice. And then Gilbert Panson was his successor.

CULLITY: Gil took over.

COHEN: As the acting dean.

CULLITY: That’s right. That’s right.

COHEN: Any feeling for his administration?

CULLITY: No. He wasn’t around long enough. He was a smart guy. I think he was a—he knew how to do campus politics.

COHEN: In what way?

CULLITY: He knew how to run a committee. He was head of the search committee for the new dean. And he had infinite patience. And we sent up many names to—not many. I think we sent three names up to Bloustein before we sent Robey’s name. But there was a committee that was split. I can’t remember the names of all the people on the committee. But certainly it had Panson, who was sort of a traditionalist and wanted to keep things going the way they always had, on one side of the committee. And his principal and you had Charlie Pine who was sort of in the middle. And then you had Dan Larin who was very much interested in change and getting into the
community and doing all this. So that committee was out for two years trying to find a new dean. Took a lot of time.

COHEN: Do you have a sense of how they settled on Robey?

CULLITY: We submitted three names.

COHEN: So you were on the committee.

CULLITY: I was on the committee.

COHEN: I see.

CULLITY: There was a guy who was a biologist up at Boston U; we sent in his name. There was a guy who was down at Camden in the law school. He’s still around someplace. He was the acting dean or maybe he was the dean of the Camden school. I’ve forgotten his name. We sent in his name. Begins with an S, but I can’t remember what it is. We sent in a third name, too, I think. But I can’t recall the third person at all. We went down to see Bloustein. He was brand new. We were the first ones or amongst the first ones ever to get in to see Bloustein because he was a brand-new president. And he got his down in the office, and we chatted with him. And blah blah blah blah blah. And the word: Thank you very much for your work; but the word always came back, keep trying. They’re good, but not—well, we can do better than that. And then we get to Robey. And Robey was a young guy who was over at Columbia. Had gotten a degree in literature from Yale. But he hadn’t worked in English much. Maybe he’d logged a year or two years in the English Department at Columbia, and then he went right into administration as an assistant dean. Columbia was having its own trouble with Mark Rudd and all those people at that time. And Robey was sort of a troubleshooter or was involved in the negotiations evolving at Columbia then.

COHEN: Oh.

CULLITY: And Robey was sufficiently ambiguous in his responses to the committee, it seems to me, that—and we were all tired. You know that two years we’d gone through session after session. We were all tired. So both sides said, “Well, he’ll do.” Or something like that. But I think Panson was the acting dean toward the end of that, I guess. And then Robey came on.

COHEN: The Robey administration. What can you say about that?

CULLITY: I don’t think he was a good dean.

COHEN: No?

CULLITY: I think he was…I don’t know. He just wasn’t, he wasn’t up to the job.

COHEN: What happened?
CULLITY: I don’t know all of what happened. He got himself…. He managed to alienate enough people that a whole bunch of them got together. First of all, they made a move to censure him. I don’t know whether the faculty ever did that. I don’t think so. I don’t remember who called that. But Washburn and a whole bunch of guys—Manspeizer, maybe what’s-his-name, the fellow from the History Department, Jonathan Lurie and three or four others. They eventually reached the point where they were unhappy with him. But had had made a lot of people unhappy. He got into trouble. The one thing I knew a little bit about was a promotion with a guy in English, and the promotion packet was handled very, very badly.

COHEN: By the dean?

CULLITY: Yes, the dean’s office. It was handled very badly.

COHEN: I see.

CULLITY: And we went to grievance.

COHEN: Mm-hmm.

CULLITY: And it came out that the promotion packet that went from the dean’s office up was not the promotion packet that had been circulated to the other people who were looking over the documents. And so this guy had been unfairly treated. And in fact he was accorded tenure subsequently. And there was a whole big packet, that particular grievance, that packet was a big, big, big packet. And if someone upstairs read it, it didn’t—that didn’t make Robey look very good. But he just—I don’t think he was the right man for the job.

COHEN: Yes, yes. His successor was Norman Samuels, now the provost.

CULLITY: Yes.

COHEN: What can you say about his tenure as dean of the college?

CULLITY: Well, I think that Norman…Norman knows how the university runs. He’s a very able person in terms of the university system. He knows what it does, knows how to operate it. He’s a good politician. We always had—we had our problems as I’ve outlined to you before. What was driving us bananas we weren’t getting any resources. And so that was a source of continuing irritation for us. And we just thought that it was misallocation of resources. And I can’t deny that. But I’ve heard other people say Norman was really a super administrator. And Horace dePodwin. I would talk to Horace about Norman. Horace says he’s very good. Always said he was good. But I don’t think he did a good job by us.

COHEN: Is there anything that I haven’t touched on that you could give yourself a few seconds to think about….that I haven’t touched on that you’d like to bring up. I try to cover the waterfront.

CULLITY: You’ve covered an awful lot.
COHEN:  You have. [Laughs]

CULLITY:  Well, the only thing I can say that perhaps was not covered is that we had eight or nine guys—it wasn’t always guys; it was guys and gals—up on the eighth floor in Hill Hall. And it’s an enormously productive unit. It may be as productive as any unit on campus. And it’s really a lot of fun to be with those people. And I hope I’m going to be around for a few more years. [Laughter]

COHEN:  Anything to go back to that you’ve touched on? Anything to do with campus politics or anything which we maybe glossed over that you left out of it.

CULLITY:  I stopped—I never wanted to get into campus politics in the first place. Unfortunately, I was tapped to sit on many committees in the early seventies. And even until ’79 I was involved with the Economics Department and that sort of thing. And I stopped around ’79, and I said, “There’s too much politics, and I’m not going to be part of it.” And if you’ve been at a faculty meeting, and I know you have, many of them, you don’t see me up there talking. And that’s because I don’t want to, and I don’t. I’m not involved in the stuff. I’m involved in economics, and research. I’m 62 years of age right now.

COHEN:  Mm-hmm.

CULLITY:  And I’ve never been more productive. I work as hard as any of the younger guys in the department. In fact, I work harder than they do. [Laughs] I’ve got to tell you the truth. I work harder than they do. And I’m happy doing that.

COHEN:  Dr. Cullity, thank you very much. [End of Tape #3]

[End of Interview]

Edited by Gideon Thompson